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Introduction 
The general idea about civil society is that it is a positive actor in international developments. The 
dominant theory on civil society, the liberal theory, states that civil society leads to political freedom and 
stability, and that it strengthens democracy. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important 
role therein. They have a pluralizing effect on civil society by representing the interests of marginalized 
groups in society and they challenge state autonomy.1 However, the example of Russia suggests this is not 
at all times the case. Sergej Ljubownikow presents a theory about the development of a “managed civil 
society” in Russia that strengthens the political regime more than it strengthens democracy.2 This thesis 
takes a comparative perspective examining to what extent Azerbaijan has copied Russian-style NGO 
legislation and whether this has had the same effect on civil society as it has in Russia. The research 
question is: Does the copying of Russian-style NGO legislation result in a “managed civil society” that 
threatens democracy in Azerbaijan? 
 Azerbaijan was one of the first of the post-Soviet republics that copied Russian-style NGO 
legislation.3 In 2013 and 2014 it adopted a range of amendments on existing laws, which made the scope 
of the Azerbaijani NGO legislation remarkably similar to the situation in Russia, shaped by the Foreign 
Agents Law (FAL) of 2012.4 Critics of the FAL believe that the law has a negative effect on the freedom of 
NGOs. Research on the consequences of the copying of Russian-style NGO legislation by Azerbaijan is 
relevant because it provides us with information about the influence of Russia in former Soviet republics 
and the status of democracy in Azerbaijan. NGOs form the core of a civil society and carry out the interests 
and the will of the people.5 If a country has a vibrant and well-developed civil society, it is likely that there 
is political freedom and stability.6 Civil society is therefore an important factor in the development of 
democracy.7  The copying of NGO legislation in Azerbaijan fits into the academic debate about 
authoritarian diffusion. According to Ziegler, Central Asian states deliberately adapt legislation that 
shapes civil society along the lines of the Russian example. These states tend to be more receptive to this 
kind of autocratic governance than to the alternative, which is liberal democracy.8 Bader contributes to 
this debate by showing that post-Soviet states, including Azerbaijan adapted their election laws to the 
                                                          
1 C. Mercer, “NGOs, civil society and democratization: a critical review of the literature”, Progress in Development Studies 2, No. 1 
(2002), 5-22, 8-9. 
2 S. Ljubownikow, “An examination of the management of Russian civil society”, Doctoral thesis. Aston University (May 2011), 1-287, 
10, 200-201. 
3 M. Hooper, “Russia's Bad Example”, Free Russia Foundation. Human Rights First. February 2016, 1-28, 13. 
4 IFEX, “How do you take down an NGO in Eastern Europe? Accuse it of being a spy”, July 29, 2015. 
5 M. Edwards, Civil society (Cambridge 2014), 15. 
6 O. Hoppe-Kondrikova, “Struggling for civility. The Idea and the Reality of Civil Society. An Interdisciplinary Study with a Focus on 
Russia” (PhD diss., Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2012), 25. 
7 S. Lang, NGO’s, Civil Society and the Public Sphere (New York 2013), 4. 
8 C.E. Ziegler, “Great  powers, civil society and authoritarian diffusion in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey 35, no. 4 (2016), 549 – 
569, 562-563. 
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Russian model.9 Within the debate the specific topic of copying Russian NGO legislation by Azerbaijan is 
scarcely covered. Therefore this thesis contributes to our knowledge of  authoritarian diffusion.  
 The shaping of civil society, which in this case likely comes from authoritarian diffusion, can lead 
to a “managed civil society”. The concept “managed civil society” is described by Sergej Ljubownikow on 
the basis of three criteria. Firstly, the NGOs at least portray to be working in alliance with the state, 
because loyalty to the state is needed for NGOs in order to survive. Secondly, NGOs are bounded by the 
state because they are funded by the state. Lastly, they are ideologically put on the same line as the state 
by placing members or leaders of NGOs in government functions.10 Ljubownikow proves this theory in the 
case of the Russian NGO Law of 2006. In this thesis the concept of a “managed civil society” will be 
explained in detail in chapter 2, using recent Russian NGO legislation as an example. Ljubownikow’s 
criteria for the existence of a “managed civil society” will be used in chapter 3 in order to describe the 
extent to which the copying of recent Russian NGO legislation leads to  a “managed civil society” in 
Azerbaijan. 
 The methods used in order to conduct this research are process tracing and case studies. Process 
tracing uncovers the steps by which causes affect outcomes. It establishes a link between different factors, 
in this case NGO legislation and civil society, and it reveals the causality between them.11 This link can be 
referred to as the enforcement of legislation. In addition to process tracing, the method of case studies is 
used. Russia is the in-depth case study. Azerbaijan forms the comparative case.12 It is chosen as the 
comparative case for three reasons. Azerbaijan is one of the first countries of the former Soviet Union that 
adopted Russian-style NGO legislation. Therefore the consequences on a longer term are better to 
distinguish than in other former Soviet countries. Secondly, research on Azerbaijan is relatively feasible 
according to the available sources and information.13 Lastly, as previously mentioned, we find a gap in the 
academic debate about authoritarian diffusion according to NGO legislation in Azerbaijan. Based on 
developments in the legislative field, my hypothesis is: The copying of Russian-style NGO legislation 
results in a “managed civil society” that threatens democracy in Azerbaijan. 
 This thesis is divided in three main chapter. The first chapter frames the existing academic debate 
and structures the examination of contemporary civil society developments in the Russian Federation and 
Azerbaijan, focusing on post-Soviet civil society and NGOs. Definitions of civil society and NGOs as well as 
the leading International Relations theory in research about  these topics are reflected upon. Chapter two 
focuses on the concept of “managed civil society”. Sergej Ljubownikow’s theory will be discussed in detail 
as well as the work of other academics. The most recent Russian NGO legislation functions as a 
background to which the Azerbaijani NGO legislation is depicted later on in chapter 3. Chapter 2 outlines 
                                                          
9 M. Bader, “Democracy promotion and authoritarian diffusion: The foreign origins of post-Soviet election laws.”, Europe-Asia Studies 
66, no.8 (2014), 1350 – 1370, 1351n 
10 Ljubownikow, “An examination”, 200-201. 
11 A. Dur, “Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodology”, European Union Politics 9, no. 4, 561-562. D.D. 
Porta and M. Keating, Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences (Cambridge 2008), 232. 
12 Porta, Approaches and methodologies, 209. 
13 Hooper, “Russia’s Bad Example”, 15. 
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the way in which Ljubownikow’s criteria for a “managed civil society” will be used in chapter 3 to 
determine to what extent Russian-style NGO legislation has a “managed civil society” as a result in 
Azerbaijan.  
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Chapter 1: Post-Soviet civil society: definition and debate 
The academic literature about the relation between NGOs, civil society and democracy is to a great extent 
focused on countries in Africa and South-East Asia. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, academics 
started to focus on the development of NGOs and civil society in the former Soviet republics, whereby the 
focus is on the Russian Federation. Many studies focus on environmental organizations, women’s rights 
movements or human rights organizations.14 In this chapter, first the general definitions of civil society 
and NGOs are discussed. Thereafter the leading theory on civil society, the liberal theory, is reflected upon. 
Lastly, a short overview of the civil society and NGOs in the post-Soviet space, specifically in Russia and 
Azerbaijan, is given. The next chapter deepens an important aspect of this debate, the concept of a 
“managed civil society”. 
1.1 Civil society and non-governmental organizations 
The recent literature about civil society in general is extensive. The first to use the term civil society was 
the Enlightenment thinker John Locke. He defined civil society as the way in which people give 
authorization to the government. It creates conditions for people to live together by installing rules and 
customs.15 In contemporary definitions the aspect of strengthening the government by giving it authority 
over society is less prominently present and the focus has shifted to the strengthening of democracy. 
Michael Edwards is a contemporary authority in this field and he  distinguishes three types of civil society. 
Civil society can be seen as a kind of society, that acts independently from the government with 
organizations forming its core. It can also be referred to as a part of society, often seen as the ‘good part’ 
that opposes the government. Lastly civil society is said to concern the public sector, emphasizing its 
importance for democracy and the representation of the public opinion.16 A definition that became 
important after 1950 is the “third sector”. It highlights the significance of NGOs and states that civil society 
acts separately from government and business.17 Francis Fukuyama disagrees herewith and states that the 
business sector is an actor within and driver of civil society as well.18 Besides these authors, also the book 
of Sabine Lang and articles written by Mercer, Clarke and Neace are used in this thesis to obtain 
knowledge about civil society. 
 Concerning research on the development of a “managed civil society”, Sergej Ljubownikow 
follows a definition of civil society presented by Neace, who defines civil society as “the social space 
between the individual family and the state” … “made up of autonomous freely chosen intermediary 
                                                          
14 Ljubownikow, “An examination”, 13. 
15 J. Locke, “Concerning Civil Government”, in: R. Hutchins, ed., Great Books of the Western World (Chicago 1937), 74. 
16 Edwards, Civil society, 10. 
17 L.M. Salamon, H.K. Anheier, “Civil Society in Comparative Perspective”, in: L.M. Salamon (and others), Global Civil Society. 
Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector (Baltimore 1999), 3-39. 
18 F. Fukuyama, Trust (New York 1995), 360. 
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organizations” … “supported by a system of behavioral norms that includes refined and civil manners”.19 
My thesis only concerns the first part of this definition, focusing mainly on the role of NGOs and the state 
according to civil society and less on the broader concept of social capital. 
 Most academic definitions of civil society organizations bring forward that: they are not directly 
related to the government, making profit is not their priority and they are for a large part run by 
volunteers who focus on the general interest.20 Concerning these organizations Ljubownikow uses the 
term “third sector organizations (TSOs)”. TSOs include a slightly wider range of organizations than NGOs, 
including the field of family and individual ties.21 I have deliberately chosen to use the term NGOs to 
underline that the focus of this thesis is on legislation and not on this broader concept. 
1.2 The liberal theory 
The liberal theory is the dominant theory about civil society and NGOs nowadays. It states that NGOs are a 
part of civil society and thereby strengthen it, what leads to democratization. NGOs do this in three ways: 
by having a pluralizing effect on civil society, by representing the interests of marginalized groups and by 
challenging the state on national as well as local level.22 Professor Michael Bratton is considered to be the 
founder of the idea that NGOs strengthen civil society.23 Thereafter many scholars followed his line of 
thought. Two examples are Diamond and Oxhorn, both arguing that a strong civil society can prevent the 
state from becoming too powerful by pluralizing the range of democratic organizations.24 
 Critique on this theory can be divided in two: general critique and the identification of exceptions. 
General critique often focuses on the fact that we ascribe more influence to civil society than it actually has 
on the state. This might occur from biased research. Gerard Clarke for example argues that a falsely 
positive image of NGOs is created by one-sided literature about this topic.25 Mercer adds that the 
promotion of civil society as positive factor can lead to the neglect of other protagonists of democracy.26 
This kind of moderate critique on the liberal theory resulted in new theories on civil society, such as the 
deliberative theory. This theory attaches more importance to the role of public reasoning, rational 
consensus and communicative interaction and less to non-governmental organizations.27 The second 
group of critical scholars demonstrates that there are countries to which the liberal theory about civil 
                                                          
19 M.B. Neace, “Emerging Economies: Creating Trust, Social Capital, and Civil Society”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science no.565 (1999), 148-161. 
20 Lang, NGO’s, Civil Society and the Public Sphere, 12. 
21 Ljubownikow, “An examination”, 34. 
22 Mercer, “NGOs, civil society”, 8-9. 
23 M. Bratton,  “The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa”, World Development 17, No.4 (1989), 569-587, 573, 584. 
24 L. Diamond, “Rethinking civil society: toward democratic consolidation”, Journal of Democracy 5, 4-18, 5. P. Oxhorn, “When 
democracy isn’t all that democratic: social exclusion and the limits of the public sphere in Latin America”, The North-South Agenda 
(2001), 1-26, 3. 
25 G. Clarke, “Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing World”, Political Studies 46, no.1 (1998), 36-52, 
39-40. 
26 Mercer, “NGOs, civil society”, 10. 
27 Hoppe-Kondrikova, “Struggling for civility”, 57. 
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society does not seem to apply. This is argued by Sarah Henderson, Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova 
and Sergej Ljubownikow regarding the former Soviet countries.28 
1.3 Civil society and NGOs in the post-Soviet space 
Literature about civil society and NGOs in the post-Soviet space tends to differ from these general ideas 
about civil society. Academics who have done research on civil society in post-Soviet states, such as Sarah 
Henderson and Sergej Ljubownikow, question the fact that NGOs operate independently from the 
government. Governments often influence NGOs by legislative regulations, by their public rhetoric with 
respect to NGOs and by their ability to provide access to funding.29 It is noteworthy that academics from 
within the post-Soviet region, such as Zinaida Golenkova, come up with a similar conclusion. Golenkova 
highlights the fact that there is no autonomous society in this region, which prevents it from being anti-
statist and strengthening democracy.30 None of Edwards definitions of civil society seems to apply to the 
post-Soviet space. For this thesis I chose to examine Ljubownikow’s theory in the light of the Azerbaijani 
civil society above the other mentioned academics who demonstrate that former Soviet countries act 
differently than the liberal theory describes, because Ljubownikow defines NGO legislation as the most 
important instrument for the state to create such a “managed civil society”.31 This goes well with research 
on the copying of Russian-style NGO legislation by Azerbaijan. As earlier mentioned, the concept of a 
“managed civil society” is worked out in detail in chapter 2. 
 Although the focus of this thesis is on recent NGO legislation in Russia and Azerbaijan, it is 
important to have some knowledge about the state of civil society and earlier NGO legislation in order to 
be able to detect a pattern in the legislative development and to fully understand the consequences of the 
most recently implemented NGO legislation. What Russia and Azerbaijan have in common is the fact that 
they are both countries of the former Soviet Union. This has influenced their contemporary civil society. 
Civil society in the Soviet Union was institutionalized. It did not function independently from the state, but 
was organized by the state. This high degree of influence on civil society is still visible in former Soviet 
countries.32 The form of and activity within civil society is largely determined by the government.33 Some 
scholars perceive the existence of marionette NGOs as a legacy from the Soviet Union. These are 
organizations that are nested within elite structures.34 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, civil society in 
Russia and Azerbaijan has developed in a rather similar way, which is typical for post-Soviet countries. 
 
                                                          
28 S.L. Henderson, “Civil Society in Russia. State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin Era”, Problems of Post-Communism 58, no. 3 
(2011), 11-27. D. Javeline, and S. Lindemann-Komarova, “A Balanced Assessment of Russian Civil Society”, Journal of International 
Affairs (2010). Ljubownikow, “An examination”, 1-128. 
29 Henderson, “Civil Society in Russia”, 12. 
30 Z.T. Golenkova., “Civil Society in Russia”, Russian social Science Review 40, no.1, 4-18, 4,5,15. 
31 Ibidem, 207-208. 
32 B.P. Kennedy, I. Kawachi, and E. Brainerd, “The role of social capital in the Russian mortality crisis”, World Development 26, no.11 
(1998), 2029-2043, 2038. 
33 U. Pape, “Civil Society and the Politics of HIV/AIDS in Russia” (PhD diss. Groningen University. 2012). 
34 A. Uhlin, Post-Soviet Civil Society. Democratization in Russia and the Baltic States (Oxon 2006), 49. 
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1.3.1 The Russian Federation 
After the fall of the Soviet Union there was little attention for NGOs and not much regulation concerning 
NGOs was implemented.35 New NGOs arose, but also Soviet marionette NGOs managed to survive.36 
However, policy changed after Putin came to power in 2000 and became more restrictive according to 
NGOs. This was induced by the so-called color revolutions that occurred in former Soviet republics. Putin 
linked these events to civil society and foreign influence and meant to prevent Russia from similar 
risings.37 In particular two legislative measures are important to mention as precursors of more recent 
NGO legislation: the establishment of the Public Chamber and the 2006 NGO law. 
 The Public Chamber is an institution that analyzes draft legislation, monitors activities of 
government institutions and acquires knowledge about the needs and interests of Russian citizens, in 
order to improve interaction between the government and Russian citizens. In practice, it has become an 
instrument for the government to keep control over civil society, since the president has great influence 
on the appointment of members of the Public Chamber. 38 The NGO Law of 2006 excluded foreigners and 
stateless persons from founding an NGO in Russia, sharpened the conditions and expanded the required 
documents needed for NGO registration and allowed the government to investigate NGOs and their 
activities.39 From 2008 – 2012 during Medvedev’s presidency, the debate about civil society somewhat 
opened up. This changed when Putin came back to power in 2012.40  
1.3.2 Azerbaijan 
Civil society in Azerbaijan has developed in a rather similar way since the fall of the Soviet Union. In the 
years after 1991, the civil society sector developed and started activity in diverse fields of society.41 In 
2003 and 2005 there were attempts to organize revolts against the government, which are by some 
academics seen as a failed attempt to a color revolution in Azerbaijan.42 This might have been an incentive 
for the government to conduct the more repressive policy against NGOs and foreign influence that 
followed in the subsequent years.  
 In 2007 the Azerbaijani government established the NGO Support Council, an institution that is 
similar to Russia’s Public Chamber. The International Center for Not-for-Profit-Law (ICNL) refers to it as a 
positive development for civil society.43 Human Rights Watch on the other hand states that experts fear 
that the Council makes NGOs more dependent on state budget, which leads to vulnerability to political 
                                                          
35 J. Crotty, S.M. Hall, S. Ljubownikow, “ Post-Soviet Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation: the Impact of the NGO-law”, 
Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 8 (2014), 1253. 
36 Uhlin, Post-Soviet Civil Society, 49. 
37 Crotty, Hall, Ljubownikow, “Post-Soviet Civil Society Development”, 1253. 
38 Evans, “The Public Chamber”, 5. 
39 Crotty, Hall, Ljubownikow, “Post-Soviet Civil Society Development”, 1255. 
40 Pape, “Civil Society and the Politics of HIV/AIDS in Russia”, 38. 
41 International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, “NGO Law Monitor: Azerbaijan”, January 17, 2017 
42 S.L. Wolchik, “Can there be a color revolution?”, Journal of Democracy 23, no.3 (2012), 63-70. 
43 ICNL, “NGO Law Monitor: Azerbaijan”. 
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pressure.44 Furthermore, in 2009 a law that extended the requirements for NGO registration was 
implemented. This law can be compared to the Russian 2006 NGO law. For this reason a number of NGOs 
had to close down or stop their activities.45 ICNL explains that many NGOs do not have the capacity to 
comply with the requirements.46 
 The state of post-Soviet civil society, explained for the cases of Russia and Azerbaijan, shows that 
the liberal theory does not seem to apply to Russia, nor do the general ideas about civil society of 
contemporary scholars such as Edwards and Bratton. A concept that seems more applicable is a “managed 
civil society”. The next chapter further explains this concept using Russia’s recent NGO legislation as an 
example, before it, in the last chapter,  is applied to NGO legislation in Azerbaijan. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44 Human Rights Watch, “Tightening the Screws: Azerbaijan’s Crackdown on Civil Society and Dissent”, September 1, 2013. 
45 Hooper, “Russia’s Bad Example”, 13. 
46 ICNL, “NGO Law Monitor: Azerbaijan”. 
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Chapter 2: “Managed civil society”: the example of Russia’s Foreign Agents Law  
The nature of a “managed civil society” is the ability of the state to dominate and direct civil society.47 It 
reflects the ability of the state to manage its relation with society, which has a negative effect on the 
development of democracy.48 
2.1 Sergej Ljubownikow and “managed civil society” 
Sergej Ljubownikow argues that Russian civil society became dominated by organizations founded and 
controlled by the Russian state after the NGO Law of 2006. He evinces the existence of a “managed civil 
society”. Ljubownikow presents three criteria for a “managed civil society”. Firstly, NGOs at least portray 
to be working in alliance with the state, because loyalty to the state is needed for NGOs in order to survive. 
Secondly, NGOs are funded by the state and by this, they have become a part of the state’s infrastructure. 
The state does this either by subsidizing certain organizations, or by putting restrictions on other forms of 
finance than government funding. Lastly, the state tries to impose this ideology by tightening their 
relations with NGOs, for example through the appointment of employees or leaders of NGOs to 
government duty. This can lead to the emergence of so-called marionette or “hybrid” NGOs. 49 Briefly 
explained, Ljubownikow’s criteria for a “managed civil society” are: 
 At least pretending to be working in alliance with state is needed for NGOs to survive. 
 State funding incorporates NGOs in state infrastructure. 
 Imposition of government ideology on NGOs tightens relations between government and NGOs. 
The first time Ljubownikow presented this argument was in his PhD thesis published in 2011. Since 
then he has continued his research, now being an expert in this field. In 2013, 2014 and 2015, 
Ljubownikow wrote three other articles about this topic in cooperation with scholars as Hall, Crotty and 
Rodgers. In the article of 2013, Ljubownikow, Crotty and Rodgers look in more detail on the dependency 
of Russian NGOs on the state while unraveling a causal link with the situation in the Soviet Union.50 The 
article of Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow of 2014 follows largely the line of reasoning of Ljubownikow’s 
PhD thesis, showing that the 2006 NGO Law caused the dominance of marionette NGOs over Russian civil 
society, which harms the development of democracy in Russia.51 Lastly, the article from 2015 examines 
the relations between the state and NGOs in three specific Russian cities.52 The three articles give 
additional information about Ljubownikow’s idea of “managed civil society”, but do not so much present a 
                                                          
47 Ljubownikow, “An examination”, 2. 
48 Ibidem, 15. 
49 Ibidem, 200-201. 
50 S. Ljubownikow, J. Crotty, P.W. Rodgers, “The state and civil society in Post-Soviet Russia: The development of a Russian-style civil 
society”, Progress in Development Studies 13, no.2 (2013), 153-166. 
51 J. Crotty, S.M. Hall, S. Ljubownikow, “ Post-Soviet Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation: the Impact of the NGO-law”, 
Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 8 (2014), 1253-1269. 
52 S. Ljubownikow and J. Crotty, “Managing Boundaries: The Role of Non-Profit Organisations in Russia’s Managed Democracy”, 
Sociology, October 22, 2015, 1-17. 
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new perspective on more recent developments in the field of NGO legislation. For this reason it is worthy 
to use Ljubownikow’s PhD thesis as a starting point for research in this thesis, which analyzes civil society 
in Azerbaijan as a comparative case to civil society in Russia. 
2.2 “Managed civil society”: the academic debate 
Researchers of post-Soviet civil society largely tend to agree with Ljubownikow’s point of view. Most of 
them acknowledge the existence of marionette NGOs. Ljubownikow himself follows the idea of Jo Crotty 
concerning the concept of these marionette organizations. She argues that the curtailment of civil 
activities in Russia comes forth out of the emergence of marionette organizations.53 These organizations 
pretend to be independent from the state, while in fact they act at the discretion of the government and 
help the state manage civil society.54  
Whether we can claim that Russia has a “managed civil society” is debated by academics. Evans 
for example, states that there is no evidence that Putin has a detailed plan about forming a kind of civil 
society that answers his will.55 Sarah Henderson disagrees and argues that the state does create a 
“managed civil society” and explains the emergence of marionette NGOs as a result of the state favoring 
certain NGOs by highlighting the causal relations between the Soviet past and Color revolutions in the 
2000s. However, she argues that the increase of legal authority is a global phenomenon in democracies as 
well as in authoritarian states since 9/11. The European Human Rights Advocacy Center (EHRAC) agrees 
with Henderson’s observation and states that the phenomenon “managed civil society” is not bound to the 
former Soviet region, however it is the region on which most research about this topic focuses.56 Unlike 
Ljubownikow, Henderson argues that the biggest problem of Russian civil society is not restrictive NGO 
legislation, but rather the ignorance and lack of enthusiasm of the Russian people towards NGOs and civil 
society.57 In line with the reasoning of EHRAC this thesis examines the existence of a “managed civil 
society” in Azerbaijan.  
2.3 Characteristics of a “managed civil society”: Russia’s Foreign Agents Law as an example 
By applying Ljubownikow’s criteria for a “managed civil society” to more recent Russian NGO 
legislation, the current development of this phenomenon is analyzed. This functions as a background and 
comparative case, used when analyzing the situation in Azerbaijan, elaborated in chapter 3. The analysis 
of recent Russian NGO legislation focused on the FAL is to a certain extent based on academic articles, 
written by Hodish and Aliyev. Furthermore the observations of Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) and the Public Verdict Foundation as well as media reports are taken into account.  
                                                          
53 J. Crotty, “Making a Difference? NGOs and Civil Society Development in Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies 61, no.1 (2009), 85-108, 92. 
54 Ljubownikow, “An examination”, 77. 
55 A.B. Evans, “Vladimir Putin’s Design for Civil Society”, in: A.B. Evans, L.A. Henry, L. McIntosh Sundstrom, Russian Civil Society: A 
Critical Assessment (New York 2006), 147-160, 148. 
56 European Human Rights Advocacy Center, “Legislating against foreign funding of human rights. A tool of repression in the former 
Soviet Union”, May 25, 2016. 
57 Henderson, “Civil Society in Russia”, 19. 
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2.3.1 The Foreign Agents Law: Rules and Enforcement 
The Foreign Agents Law (FAL), introduced in Russia in 2012, states that NGOs that receive money from 
foreign donors and at the same time are engaged in political activity, are obliged to register as a “foreign 
agent”. 58 The term “political activity” is vaguely defined as “organizing political acts in order to exert 
influence on the making of decisions by state organizations, concerning changes in state policy exercised 
by them, and influences public opinion in those aims”. 59 From 2012 to 2016 several amendments on this 
law have been introduced, which mostly make the law more restrictive towards NGOs.60 
 The law aims to bring NGOs and their finances under surveillance of the Russian Ministry of 
Justice.61 For that reason NGOs need to provide more information in the form of reports, also the Ministry 
organizes audits. Non-compliance to the law can lead to the freezing of bank accounts, banning of 
participation in public events and fines up to 300 000 rubles62 and 4 years imprisonment.63 
2.3.2 Alliance with the state in order to survive 
Ljubownikow’s first criterion for a “managed civil society” is the fact that NGOs at least portray to be 
working in alliance with the state, otherwise they cannot operate within civil society. The prosecution that 
follows the enforcement of the FAL shows that this criterion is evidently present in Russia. According to 
HRW, 148 NGOs have had to register as a “foreign agent” from 2012 to 2016. 28 NGOs chose to shut down 
rather than to be registered as a “foreign agent”. Only 21 NGOs have been removed from the Foreign 
Agents List. At the end of 2016, 101 NGOs were on this list, of which only four registered voluntarily.64 
According to the Public Verdict Foundation 108 cases of administrative proceedings against NGOs for 
failing to register were followed by this law, consisting 17 against NGO directors and 91 against the 
organization. The total of fines that NGOs are required to pay is 12.3 million rubles on the base of 55 
enforced judgements.65 In June 2016 the first case of criminal prosecution of a human rights defender for 
the violation of the FAL was opened against Valentina Cherevatenko, leader of the NGO Women of the Don. 
If she will be convicted, she faces two years imprisonment.66 In the debate about the consequences of the 
FAL is no consensus about whether it has led to the closure of NGOs on a large scale. Research of the 
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English newspaper The Economist concludes for example that the law led to a lack of financial resources 
and was time consuming, but only led in few cases to the closure of the organization.67 
2.3.3 State funding incorporates NGOs in state infrastructure 
There is little proof that state subsidies are actually given to NGOs by the Russian state. However, besides 
to non-profit organizations the FAL also applies to state foundations, state corporations and state 
companies. So the Russian state is on paper able to create and control the civil society sector, as well as to 
legally allocate funding to civil society.68 The fact that religious organizations that are set up with help 
from the state are not covered by the FAL substantiates this conclusion.69 
 The other aspect of this criterion, namely the restriction on forms of finance other than 
government finance, is more pronounced. The FAL contributes to this in two ways. Firstly, due to Soviet 
history, the label “foreign agent” has a negative connotation and is interpreted as “spy” or “traitor”. It 
damages the credibility of an organization and provides organizations with much more difficulty to raise 
financial resources from Russian funders.70 Secondly, due to the FAL, organizations face difficulties 
collecting financial resources from foreign funders. These donations have to be screened or are not 
allowed at all if an organization is not registered as “foreign agent”.71 
2.3.4 Imposition of government ideology on NGOs 
Concerning the imposition of government ideology on NGOs can be argued that the FAL creates a kind of 
civil society in line with the government ideology, having the emergence of marionette NGOs as a result. 
The organizations that have had criminal cases against them vary in terms of geographical location, main 
issues they focus on and organizational structure. However, the reason for their prosecution seems in 
most cases the attempt to influence public opinion or the critical evaluation of government policy.72 The 
Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta supports this conclusion and argues that the Russian 
government tries to thwart NGOs working in a certain field of action.73 The FAL is a method to build a civil 
society in a way the government wishes it to be, without respect for individual autonomy or democracy.74 
Ljubownikow’s criteria for a “managed civil society” largely seem to apply to the consequences of the 
Russian FAL. It seems that the Russian government does have a plan to manage civil society, unlike 
Henderson argues. This again does not correspond to the dominant liberal theory on civil society but leads 
to a unilateral civil society controlled by the government, which has the potential to harm democracy. In 
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the next chapter the presence of Ljubownikow’s criteria for a “managed civil society” as a consequence of 
recent NGO legislation are evaluated for the case of Azerbaijan and compared to Russia. 
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Chapter 3: Recent NGO legislation in Azerbaijan and the effect on civil society 
3.1 Russia’s Foreign Agents Law and Azerbaijan’s 2013-2014 amendments compared 
According to an article written by Jackson on behalf of the International Forum of Democratic Studies, 
Russia promotes restrictive NGO legislation in former Soviet countries.75 States with an authoritarian form 
of government, as Azerbaijan, tend to find these restrictive NGO laws appealing, because they can be used 
to strengthen their regime by reducing the power of civil society.76 This concerns the academic debate 
about authoritarian diffusion, mentioned in the introduction of this thesis. From research concerning the 
comparison between Russia’s FAL and Azerbaijan’s NGO amendments we conclude that Azerbaijan has 
not copied the FAL word by word, however the aims and the restrictive character of the 2013-2014 
amendments are clearly inspired by Russia’s FAL and therefore we speak of ‘copying’. Research conducted 
by IFEX, an international network of organizations promoting freedom of expression as fundamental right, 
concludes that  both the FAL and Azerbaijan’s 2013-2014 amendments have the intention “to discredit 
and demonize groups critical of the government”.77 According to similarity in methods of restriction, 
Hooper shows that the fact that the focus is on complicating the registration process that NGOs need to 
complete in order to receive funding, whereby foreign funding is hampered, is the most evident 
similarity.78 Perhaps what makes this comparison most interesting is that the academic literature often 
names the Russian FAL and the Azerbaijani 2013-2014 amendments in the same breath. 
 It is important to mention that there are also severe differences between the NGO laws in 
question. Azerbaijani NGOs, for example, do not need to register as a “foreign agent”, therefore they do not 
have the connotation of spy which causes funding problems that lead in some cases to the closure of 
Russian NGOs. In their turn, Azerbaijani NGOs face a different way of prosecution by the government than 
Russian NGOs do. The following paragraphs elaborate on this topic.79 
The next paragraph gives a more detailed explanation of the 2013-2014 amendments, elaborating 
on the causes, aims, enforcement and punishment. In the last paragraph of this chapter, the consequences 
will be analyzed along the line of Ljubonikow’s criteria, in the same way as chapter 2 did for the Russian 
FAL. Also there are some comparisons made to the Russian FAL in order to illustrate to what extent the 
2013-2014 amendments comply to Ljubownikow’s criteria. This analysis is based on articles written by 
experts working in the NGO sector, such as Hooper, area specialists such as Ismayil, Muradova and Aliyev 
and human rights experts such as Guluzade.  Also reports of HRW, EHRAC, FIDH, the European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law and media reports are taken into account. 
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3.2 NGO legislation in Azerbaijan since 2013 
3.2.1 Civil unrest as a cause 
Chapter one explains that the failed attempt to organize a color revolution in Azerbaijan can be seen as an 
incentive for earlier restrictive NGO legislation. Some academics argue that protests and riots in 2012 and 
2013 have formed an incentive for the Azerbaijani government to come up with more restrictions on civil 
society. In May 2012 major riots occurred during the Eurovision Song Contest, which was taking place in 
Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. Opposition leaders called for protests against corruption and human rights 
abuses, in which the government was presumed to be involved.80 The protests were put down by 
government forces.81 In 2013 mass protests occurred again when people believed the government had 
murdered an Azerbaijani soldier. Some analysts saw these protests as the potential beginning of an 
“Azerbaijani Spring”. But these riots were again put down by the government.82 
 Besides civil unrest, other reasons for the introduction on new restrictive NGO legislation in 
Azerbaijan can be pointed out. For example the overall decrease of influence that foreign diplomacy has 
on the regime in Azerbaijan.83 However, this is also likely to be a consequence of earlier implemented NGO 
legislation. NGO legislation can give the government more power over society. It is then no surprise that 
the suppression of NGOs in Azerbaijan began not long before the presidential election in October 2013.84 
Overall it can be said that color revolutions in the former Soviet region led in Azerbaijan, as well as in 
Russia, to a general fear of foreign countries influencing NGOs.85 This is all likely to have led to the 2013-
2014 amendments. 
3.2.2 Amendments: Rules and Enforcement 
The amendments of 2013 and 2014 placed NGOs in Azerbaijan under strict control of the Ministry of 
Justice and imposed further limitations on foreign influence and funding.86 The amendments concern the 
Law on Grants, the Law on Nongovernmental Organizations, and the Code of Administrative Offenses.87 
 In February 2013 the Parliament adopted amendments that state that foreign donations to NGOs 
over 200 Manat88 need approval of the Ministry of Justice in the form of a grant agreement.89 NGOs are not 
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allowed to execute projects without such an agreement.90 Further, the amendments impose that all 
funding must be received through bank transfer. As a consequence, NGOs need a bank account with a state 
bank, which eases the state control over NGOs.91 Lastly, besides tax reports, NGOs are required to deliver 
detailed financial reports on donations and information on persons or organizations from which 
donations are received.92 The fines for violating the law became five times higher than before.93 NGOs can 
be fined if they do not have a grant agreement within thirty days, if they organize a project without having 
a grant agreement, if they do not include all the required information in their financial reports and if 
donations are given in cash instead of by bank transfer. Fines for NGOs can vary between 2500 and 150 
000 Manat. Individuals, for example  managers of NGOs, can be fined between 250 and 7000 Manat.94 
 The amendments adopted in December 2013 imposed additional restrictions on the registration 
of NGOs as legal entities, the grant agreements and the required reporting to the government. By these 
amendments, non-registered NGOs can officially not be considered recipients of grants anymore.95 
Individuals that received donations now also need approval in the form of a grant agreement. The 
Azerbaijani government found this necessary, because NGOs had started to receive funds through the 
bank accounts of their managers after the amendments of February to circumvent the slow registration 
process.96 The definition of grants was extended in December 2013, now including subgrants and other 
forms of assistance.97 Also, legal representatives of NGOs need to be Azerbaijani citizen from December 
2013 on.98 Furthermore, the amendments state that foreign NGOs can only have one representation in 
Azerbaijan.99 Concerning the reporting to the Ministry of Justice, NGOs need to deliver additional detailed 
information about employees and changes in formal data.100 Penalties for non-compliance increased and 
the amendment specifically adds that NGO activity can be suspended on the base of “the creation of 
obstacles for the elimination of an emergency situation, failing to rectify deficiencies identified by the 
Ministry of Justice and the violation of the rights of its members”.101 The violation of members is vaguely 
defined. It seems to apply in case of a dispute between an NGO and its member.102  
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 The last amendments that are examined are the amendments introduced in 2014. These 
amendments add that local NGOs can only receive donations from foreign donors if these donors have an 
agreement with the Ministry of Justice.103 Also authorities can temporarily suspend or permanently ban 
national and foreign NGOs in Azerbaijan. And again, administrative requirements have been extended and 
fines have increased.104 In 2015 an additional series of rules was implemented that does not so much 
include new regulation but rather secures the implementation of the amendments from 2013 and 2014.105 
3.3 The consequences of recent NGO legislation in Azerbaijan 
The consequences of the enforcement of the 2013-2014 amendments, which reached its peak in the 
summer of 2014, seem to be severe.106 The European Court of Human Rights concluded in several cases 
that the registration process is impeded and often so much delayed that Azerbaijan violates the human 
rights provisions concerning civil and political rights, set out in the Convention and its protocol.107 On the 
basis of Ljubownikow’s criteria is examined whether this violation leads to a “managed civil society” in 
Azerbaijan.  
3.3.1 Alliance with the state in order to survive 
As in the Russian case, the numbers of prosecution following the NGO legislation prove that it is essential 
for NGOs to work in alliance with the state in order to survive. We can divide the enforcement of the 
amendments on the Azerbaijani NGO law in 2013 and 2014 in two: the prosecution of organizations and 
the prosecution of individuals.  
The report of Ismayil and Remezaite from 2016 concludes that 29 NGOs were actually subject to 
prosecution.108 A number of NGOs have their bank account frozen, as a result of which they cannot receive 
funding or spend money on activities anymore.109 In June 2014 eight NGOs found themselves in this 
situation.110  Fines are mostly imposed after tax investigations. At least 10 foreign and 17 domestic NGOs 
were severely penalized by fines.111 Parliament member Fazil Mustafa concluded after the amendments of 
February 2013 that the fines are likely to be much higher than grants received by NGOs, wherefore they 
cannot pay these fines and Azerbaijan will face an increase in appeals from Azerbaijani NGOs to the 
European Counts of Human Rights.112 The Turkish lawyer Alasgar Mammadli states that the 2013-2014 
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amendments cause the fact that Azerbaijani NGOs are not able to contribute to civil society anymore if 
they do not comply to the law.113 
Striking is the fact that criminal prosecution of individuals happens much more often in 
Azerbaijan than in Russia. Between 2013 and 2015 almost 40 human rights defenders, journalists and 
opposition figures have been sentenced to five to eight years imprisonment. This number is increasing 
each year.114 As a direct consequence of the amendments of 2014, 10 NGOs had a case opened against 
them of which most appeals are rejected.115 Well known cases of individual prosecution are those of Rasul 
Jafarov, the Chair of the NGO Human Rights Club, Intigam Aliyev, a famous human rights lawyer and the 
Chair of the Legal Education Society, Anar Mammadli, the Chair of the Election Monitoring and Democracy 
Studies Center and Leyla and Arif Yunus, respectively the director of the Institute for Peace and 
Democracy and human rights activist. They are prosecuted for non-compliance with the NGO laws and 
accused of illegal entrepreneurship, tax evasion, the abuse of power, failing to register grants from foreign 
donors and spying.116 These sentenced individuals are generally released after a relatively short period of 
imprisonment and are afterwards forced to operate within state boundaries. 117  The Azerbaijani 
government seems to predominantly use the amendments to prosecute individuals in the NGO-sector that 
do not work in alliance with the state . This causes a decrease in NGO activity, not necessarily filled up by 
NGOs working in alliance with the state. 
3.3.2 State funding incorporates NGOs in state structure 
 According to Ljubownikow’s second criterion, a state can incorporate NGOs in the state structure 
either by subsidizing organizations, or by putting restrictions on other forms of finance. In academic 
literature or other sources, there is no prove of direct government funding to NGOs in Azerbaijan. The fact 
that the amendments only include NGOs and not state foundations, state corporations and state 
companies, as they do in Russia, makes it also rather unlikely that the state is able to do this on a large 
scale. 118 
 The Azerbaijani government on the other hand clearly puts restrictions on other forms of finance. 
Since the 2013-2014 amendments it is almost impossible for unregistered NGOs to legally receive 
donations.119 The only way to receive donations over 200 Manat is by bank transfer. In order to have a 
legal bank account, NGOs have to be registered as a legal entity.120 Currently three requirements must be 
met. Firstly, the donor needs to have permission from the Ministry of Finance to give a donation to an NGO. 
Secondly, the NGO receiving the donation needs to be registered as a legal entity at the Ministry of Justice. 
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And lastly, a NGO needs to register every agreement with any organization that they entered into 
concerning donations.121 This leads to a substantial decrease in income for NGOs. And even as in Russia, 
this process costs a lot of time and money that NGOs cannot use for their regular activities. Also, NGOs are 
obligated to report to many government bodies, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Taxes, the State Employment Agency, the State Statistics Committee and the State Social 
Protection Fund.122 All these government bodies can impose penalties on NGOs.123 These penalties directly 
lead to less financial resources, which makes the work of NGOs less effective.124 Forms of finance of 
Azerbaijani NGOs are limited by the amendments. However, raising local funding isn’t as difficult for 
Azerbaijani NGOs as it is in Russia because, as said in the introduction of this chapter, the 2013-2014 
amendments do not include the “foreign agent” label as the FAL does. 
3.3.3 Imposition of government ideology on NGOs 
The enforcement of the 2013-2014 amendments seems mainly focused on the targeting of NGOs with 
ideologies controversial to the governments ideology, especially those working in the field of human 
rights. Much less than the Russian government, the Azerbaijani government seems to have the intention to 
impose an ideology on existing NGOs. The literature about marionette NGOs almost never speaks of 
Azerbaijan. It is unclear whether the gap that NGOs, targeted by the 2013-2014 amendments, leave in civil 
society is filled up in anyway.  
 Fact is that the enforcement of the 2013-2014 amendments mainly focuses on NGOs advancing an 
ideology controversial to the governments ideology. Human Rights Watch and EHRAC especially warn 
NGOs that are outspoken, challenge government policies or work on controversial issues to the margins of 
the law.125 The European Commission for Democracy Through Law states that the amendments are 
intertwined with political discourse.126 Hooper goes even further and claims that the Azerbaijani 
government wants to keep those organizations out so they cannot influence a next generation of human 
rights defenders and election monitors. 127 An example of the specific targeting of critical NGOs is the 
Public Association for Assistance to Free Economy. This NGO has been denied registration seven times in 
eight months due to minor administrative mistakes in the registration application.128 According to the 
director of the media freedom group Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety (IRFS), the consequence 
of this enforcement is that fewer NGOs are willing to work on issues related to democracy and human 
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rights.129 Human Rights NGOs are not only forced out of Azerbaijani civil society, also the working space in 
this field is made so unattractive that they decide for themselves to concentrate on another field of activity. 
The 2013-2014 amendments do not follow the Russian FAL word by word, however they are comparable 
according to the specific targeting of critical groups and organizations and the part of the methods that is 
focused on complicating the registration process.  The way in which Azerbaijan enforces the amendments 
is different from Russia, since Azerbaijan focuses much more on the criminal prosecution of NGO leaders 
and human rights defenders. The development of marionette NGOs seems largely absent in Azerbaijan. 
The closure of NGOs doesn’t seem to lead to a gap in civil society that is filled up by government friendly 
organizations, but much more to an overall shrinking of Azerbaijani civil society. 
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Conclusion 
The copying of Russian-style NGO legislation in Azerbaijan only partially results in a “managed civil 
society”, described along the lines of Ljubownikow’s criteria. Azerbaijan is introducing elements of a 
“managed civil society”, but manages it in a way that differs from Ljubownikow’s theory and from Russia’s 
approach. Although civil society legislation  from 1991 to 2009 seemed to develop in a rather similar way 
in Russia and Azerbaijan, this thesis shows that with the 2013-2014 amendments Azerbaijan chooses a 
different way of managing its civil society. The Azerbaijani government reduces the power and size of civil 
society by targeting the financial resources of NGOs and, different than in Russia, by targeting critical 
individuals with criminal prosecutions. It is remarkable that the space that targeted NGOs leave in civil 
society in Azerbaijan, is not filled up with marionette organizations that operate in alliance with the state, 
as it is in Russia.  
According to Ljubownikow’s first criterion, there is no prove for NGOs that directly work in 
alliance with the Azerbaijani state. Although the prosecution of individuals leads to the fact that formerly 
critical voices now have to toe the line, we cannot speak of an alliance. It rather leads to the disappearance 
of criticists. There is also no prove of state funding to NGOs in Azerbaijan. The second criterion can be 
partially proven right when referring to the second part of Ljubownikow’s explanation, concerning the 
restrictions on other forms of finance than government funding. However, this does not seem to 
incorporate organizations in the state structure, but rather seems to push them out of society. Due to the 
absence of marionette NGOs there is even less prove for Ljubownikow’s third criterion about the 
imposition of government ideology on NGOs. We do see the that specific groups are targeted in Azerbaijan, 
which leads to the disappearance of a certain kind of ideology within civil society, mainly the kind that is 
promoting human rights and is critical to government policy. As said, this gap does not seem to be filled 
with organizations on which government ideology is imposed. Therefore my hypothesis, stating that the 
copying of Russian-style NGO legislation results in a “managed civil society” that threatens democracy in 
Azerbaijan, has not proven to be right. Although I have to conclude that this hypothesis has not proven to 
be right in the light of Ljubownikow’s criteria, it is evident that the Azerbaijani government through the 
2013-2014 amendments  has been deliberately  cutback on civil society in Azerbaijan, which leads to a 
decrease in critical voices. 
This conclusion partially follows the leading arguments in the authoritarian diffusion debate, 
because Azerbaijan does adapt a restrictive kind of legislation that is similar to the Russian one, however 
Azerbaijan seems to use it to structure civil society in a different way than Russia does. It does strengthen 
the arguments of Henderson, Ljubownikow and Golenkova who question the fact that NGOs are able to 
operate independently from the government in former Soviet states. And in this way it also proves that 
the liberal theory is not applicable to Azerbaijani civil society. The 2013-2014 amendments made it 
impossible for NGOs, especially those that are critical to the regime, to pluralize civil society, represent 
marginalized groups in society or challenge state authority. None of the definitions of Edwards seems to 
be applicable to the contemporary Azerbaijani civil society. 
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Azerbaijan deviates from the general trend in academic literature on post-Soviet civil society 
which supposes the existence on marionette NGOs. It is managing civil society in its own way, introducing 
elements of a “managed civil society” which can threaten democracy in Azerbaijan. However, it does not 
sufficiently respond to Ljubownikow’s criteria to define it as a “managed civil society”. 
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